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Thank you for inviting me to testify on the important subject 
of U.S./European economic relations. I would like to address the 
common perspectives which we and our Allies have concerning East 
West trade, particularly in the area of strategic export controls. 
I recently resigned from the State Department because of my 
inability to continue to perform in a responsible manner the 
.; 
export control functions of the Director of the Office of East 
West Trade. Lack of· input from Defense, which is the only agency 
which has the capability to identify with precision what is 
militarily critical, was preventing successful negotiations with 
our Allies concerning strengthened strategic export controls. 
Parallel Allied controls are necessary to make U.S. controls 
effective. For mo.st items the United States is not a unique 
,. 
supplier. Even where the U.S. is the only supplier, Allied coopera-
tion is necessary to control reexports of U.S.-origin items, exports 
of the foreign-made product of U.S.-origin technology, and sales by 
U.S. subsidiaries located abroad. The issue is how to achieve the 
requisite Allied cooperation. 
My thesis is that the Allies are willine cooperators in the 
important area of strategic export controls. 
The conventional wisdom that our Allies want to sell items 
which we want to control is~lar8ely untrue. They do generally 
resist on-again, off-again foreign policy export controls. But 
their cooperation concerning security export controls has been 
reasonably 8ood for 34 years. This cooperation has taken place in 
the Coordina_ting Committee, or COCOM, in iJhich the NATO nations plus 
Japan participate. Western controls have been generally effective 
.. . .
,. 
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for COCOM-listed items for which license applications have been 
sought. Leakage has occurred in two other respects - (1) because 
controls have been illegally circumvented and (2) because some items 
of concern are not COCOM-listed. Our Allies do take remedial action 
against illegal diverters when we brine to their attention solid 
evidence of violations of their COCOM-related laws and regulations. 
The principal problem from the perspective of Stat~ Department 
export control responsibilities is, therefore, how to strengthen 
the COCOM list of controlled items. This requires hard work, to 
determine with technical precision what is militarily critical in 
areas where the Soviets are defi-cient. 
Our Allies make many valuable contributions to COCOM List 
Review efforts. The problem is not how to persuade them to do 
what we think is best. The 1948-1949 Soviet blockade of Berlin 
persuaded them 34 years ago that strategic exports must be con-
trolled. More recent Soviet activity in Afghanistan and Poland has 
reinforced that persuasion. 
How can we best work together with them to up-date the details 
of the list? History is replete with examples of how not to do it. 
Failures 
Time and time again the United States has sought controls 
without adequately listening to constructive suggestions from our 
Allies. In each such case we have invariably failed. 
Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) 
A 1976 Defense Science Board report stiumlated an immense 
effort to develop a comprehensive militarily critical technologies 
list, or MCTL. This work started from a zero base, largely 
ignoring three decades of COCOM activity. The current MCTL 
fills 17 thick volumes. Entries are inevitably of uneven quality. 
Some are too general to serve as control definitions. Others are 
so specific as to give rise to concern that present or future 
critical technologies., migh.t inadvertently be omitted. The hope 
we held out to ourselves and to our Allies that the MCTL would 
be a panacea whereby we could control significant know-how and 
decontrol products has proven to be illusory. The exercise has 
been too am~itious, too unfocussed, and insufficiently related 
to past cooperative efforts with our Allies in COCOM. 
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Major Projects in Defense Priority Industries 
In 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we pressed 
the Allies to refrain from "major projects" in the USSR. Neverthe-
less, French and German firms replaced U.S. firms which had been 
denied export li"censes by contracting te> provide to the Soviet 
Union equipment and technology for, respectively, a steel mill and 
an aluminum smelter. Our Allies argued that their contracts 
differred technically from U.S. intended sales. We thereupon 
proposed in COCOM infor~al consultation on Soviet projects with more 
than $100 million Western input involving "process know-how" in a 
comprehensive list of "defense priority industries." Our Allies 
responded that (1) "$100 million" was not a strategic criterion; 
(2) "process know-how" and "defense priority industries" were not 
adequately defined; and (3) COCOM agreements disciplined by a 
formal-case review procedure subject to the rule of unanimity were 
preferable to informal consultation. 
Computers 
Negotiations ·to revise the computer item were proceeding 
reasonably well in the Spring of 1983, when an informal COCOM computer 
working group put together a composite draft. But this momentum was 
lost in the summer. This was because Defense failed to provide any 
technical advice to State which would have permitted the development 
of an official U.S. position on the composite draft. Such advice 
was needed to prepare for an October meeting at which we had hoped 
to reach final conclusions. 
Oil and Gas 
In February 1983, the United States submitted about 24 oil and 
gas related proposals to COCOM. This was one of the follow-up actions 
to the November 1982 lifting of unilateral U.S. pipeline controls. In 
December 1982 Allied agreement was reached to seek harmonization of 
East West economic policies through a number of studies, including 
one in COCOM on "other high technology including oil and gas." The 
• February U.S. oil and gas proposals were clearly in need of further 
refinement before they could be incorporated in a control list. 
Nevertheless, in April 1983, a COCOM Ad Hoe Group agreed that about 
half of them, with some modifications, were sufficiently well-
justified tb warrant further study for possible controls. It was 
not surprising that the July meeting of the COCOM Ad Hoe Group declined 
to consider a June resubmission of the original February proposals, 
which did not take into account Allied views expressed in April. 
.• 
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It was also not surprising that Cabinet-level officials questioned 
a September 13 Assistant Secretary-level committee's recommendation 
to place the February list of U.S. proposals under unilateral U.S. 
controls and to deny a major pendine case for deep submersible pumps. 
Successes 
It is clear that proposals do not succeed when we are not 
sufficiently sensitive to helpful ideas from our Allies. It is 
equally clear that proposals are agreed upon if followed by 
cooperative efforts leading to technically precise, well-justified, 
and administrable definitions . 
. MCTL 
Some of the good MCTL work has been helpful in refining U.S. 
proposals for individual items in the COCOM List Review. 
No-Exceptions Policy 
Following Afghanistan, the United States adopted a policy of 
approving no exports to the USSR exceeding the technically defined 
limits above which COCOM review for exceptions cases is required. 
I 
There have_ been virtually no such exceptions for the past four years. 
Metallurgy 
When objecting to the U.S. "process know-how" proposal, the 
Allies suggested as an alternative that the United States submit 
technically precise proposals to revise the formal COCOM list. We 
did so, concentrating in the defense priority industry of metallurgy. 
They then agreed, after careful review and reasonable modifications, 
to U.S. proposals to control three important, precisely defined items 
in the areas of (1) technolo3y for the production of superalloys; 
(2) spherical aluminum powder and the technology for achieving 
uniform particle size and sphericity of metal powders in general; and 
(3) equipment and technology for the production of munitions list items. 
Computers 
One particularly well-justified element of our 1978 computer 
proposal (array transform processors for signal processing or image 
enhancement) has been accepted de facto in COCOM even though it is not 
yet formally incorporated in the COCOM list. 
Other Items, Including Oil and Gas 
Our Al}ies have recently agreed to a number of high priority, 
well-defined U.S. proposals to strengthen controls in such areas as 
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silicon and space vehicles. Some of these have relevance to the 
oil and gas area. For example, there is much in common between the 
technolo8y for deep submersible pumps and that for pumps in space 
vehicle propulsion systems. 
Key to Success 
For effective controls there is no substitute for hard work in 
cooperation with our Allies to develop technically-detailed and well-
focussed controls .. 
Export Administration Act 
Given the serious foreign policy consequences of inadequate 
cooperation with our Allies, I would like to point out some portions 
of Export Administration Act proposals now under consideration by the 
Senate which would be damaging to the kind of Allied cooperation which 
is vital to effective export controls. 
Defense "Veto" 
The ,,so-called Defense "veto" in Section 10 ( g) should preferably 
be repealed but at least should not be expanded,. as proposed, tb 
apply to West-West as well as to West-East export cases. This section 
of law encourages officials in Defense to conclude (counter-productively) 
that views not only of other agencies but also of other Government are 
irrelevant in determining what should be controlled. It is bad 
enough for our exports to the East to be curtailed beyond restrictions 
needed because of carefully defined st~ategic considerations. 
But we must avoid further unnecessary impediments to our much more 
important exports to Western destinations. 
Industrial Capabilities 
A proposed findi-ng that exports are of concern if they contribute 
to "industrial capabilities" ( as contrasted ·with the present wording 
of "military potential") would not only be inconsistent with our oft-
repeated denials of intent to wage economic warfare but would also 
point us back toward the non-productive 1980 effort to control exports 
to poorly-defined "defense priority industries." 
Import Sanctions 
An authorization to deny U.S. imports from firms violatin8 
regulations issued pursuant to COCOM commitments would indicate to 
our Allies that we think we know better than tl1ey do what constitutes 
' ... 
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a violation and what should be done about it. This is a formula 
to discourage rather than to encourase prosress based on the 
constructive cooperation in COCOM which has been built up over the 
years. 
Extraterritoriality and Retroactivity 
The prospects for needecf co6-peration in administering multi-
lateral strategic export controls are greatly strained when we 
penalize foreign firms for non-cooperation in u.s: unilateral controls, 
whether we call such unilateral controls "security" or "foreign 
policy." This is especially true if the U.S. controls affect 
exports of non-U.S.-origin items from subsidiaries abroad or affect 
pre-existing foreign contracts. 
Export Sanctions 
Mandatory denial of exports to violators, as proposed in 
Section 5(1), would discourage cooperation. A disproportionate 
U.S. penalty might be required against a foreign firm which 
inadvert~ntly permits diversion to an unauthorized but benign 
end-use. 
Intra-COCOM Exports 
We should discontinue U.S. license requirements for exports to 
and reexports from other COCOM countries of COCOM-listed items. The 
license requirement serves no useful purpose. It does not aid 
enforcement. Instead we should require written assurances from 
ultimate end-users against reexports ~nless authorized by the host 
country. The end-user assurance would be an improvement in enforce-
ment over the present practice of obtaining such statements only from 
distributors in most instances. Deferral to host country authorization 
for reexports would not reduce U.S. control for cases subject to COCOM 
review,because of the opportunity for a U.S. veto under the COCOM rule 
of unanimity. For lower performance items, such deferral would be 
consistent with commitments we gave our Allies years ago that/we 
would respect their views for items which, under COCOM agreements, 
can be shipped at national ·discretion. 
COCOM Treaty 
Requiring ne3otiations for a COCOM treaty would also discourage 
cooperation. This might even jeopardize continued COCOM membership 
of several of our Allies, where the COCOM concept would encounter 
severe domestic political criticism in any parliamentary debate. 
.. ' .. ·~ 
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Even if a treaty were successfully negotiated, we could not obtain 
(and probably would not want to obtain) a supra-national body. 
Accordin81Y, we would achieve no strengthening of the organization 
and would risk conditions which would weaken COCOM. Merely seeking 
negotiations for a treaty would unwisely indicate U.S. dissatisfaction 
with existing COCOM organizational arran8ements, which have served us 
well for many decades. 
Summary 
There is no need for any major changes in how COCOM operates. 
It works well when~ give it a chance. This we do when~ cooperate 
in the joint search with our Allies for clear, technically precise, 
well-justified, and administrable controls. 
